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**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE**
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: _____
03 APR 1979

SUBJECT: Proposed Change in the Charter of the
Computer Security Subcommittee

TO: Director
         Central Intelligence Agency
         ATTN: Mr. Gambino (Chairman, Security Committee)
         Washington, DC 20505   STAT

1.   In January of this year, I submitted a proposal (attached) to
the members of the Computer Security Subcommittee and asked them for a
formal (Agency) response by the February meeting. At the February meeting,
it became clear that more time was required by the members, so the date
for response was extended to 15 March, with the subject to be discussed
more fully at the 22 March meeting.

2.   At the 22 March meeting, there were still a number of agencies
which had not fully responded (including NSA). The subcommittee spent
about an hour and a half discussing my proposal without reaching any
consensus, but there was a general view that they would like guidance
from the Security Committee -- especially after [_____] report   STAT
on discussions of the Security Committee at [_____]

3.   Fundamentally, a number of the members believe that any
charter expansion (such as I propose) should only come on an intiative
from SECOM, rather than from subcommittee action. Some other members
are fairly neutral -- seeing no real need for a change in the subcom-
mittee's charter.

4.   My point of view (also supported by some other members) is
that the present charter leaves the subcommittee with the job of setting
policies for protecting intelligence information by computer security
means when intelligence is present in some computers -- not in others.
Specifically, computers used as telecommunication devices such as
switches and buffers are excluded by the language in DCID 1/11.

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Serial: [   ]   STAT

5.   This dichotomy between communications computers and other computers was much more realistic in the past than it is today. As increasing numbers of computers are linked together performing all kinds of functions, including both communication and routine general data processing service, the distinction is not very clear. I am concerned that we already have a "double standard" with the application of very strict rules to general purpose computers under DCID 1/16 and a different set of rules in AUTODIN I. I believe that it is essential that if intelligence information is to be adequately protected in the future, AUTODIN II and related computers must provide the same level of protection as other computers in the intelligence "system." Since communication computers may be used in a more restricted way, it does not necessarily mean that they must be protected in exactly the same way as general purpose systems such as SAFE, but the level of protection, or conversely -- the risk, should be about the same in both cases.

6.   If a single group were to define the rules for all computer uses, it would almost certainly mean that "classes of use" or applications would need to be defined and then rules for each class would be developed with a goal of uniform protection across all classes. It would not be a simple task, but I believe that, in the long run, it should be done. It would almost certainly require some full time supporting staff, which could be attached to SECOM or to the subcommittee.

7.   As I see it, the "status quo" alternative deals with only a part of the problem, viz., computer security for computers used in general purpose information processing of intelligence. This role corresponds closely to the overall role of the Information Handling Committee (IHC), so there may be some need to explore further this relationship.

8.   To further cloud the picture, the COMSEC committee, which is about to be created as a successor to the COMSEC board, may feel that much of computer security is in its domain. I have had a long talk with [   ] (of NSA) who has been drafting and staffing the new COMSEC   /   STAT committee charter. We did not come to a clear understanding of the boundary between COMSEC and computer security. The COMSEC committee's charter is still under review by legal experts, including NSA's General Counsel. I have mentioned the "boundary" problem to him and also sent him a note outlining my thoughts on the subject.

Serial: [   ]   STAT

9.   In summary, I do not think there are easy answers to the
topics I raise above, but I believe that they should be dealt with if we
are to give any thing more than lip service to computer security.   I
will be glad to discuss this further with you at your convenience and I
am willing to present the general problem -- as I see it -- to the SECOM
if you wish.   STAT

Chairman, Computer Security Subcommittee

Encl:
  a/s

Copy Furnished:
  DCI Security Committee [   ]   STAT

Chief, T4
Plans and Project Development

4 April 79

Mr. Gambino

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Reference letter ▢ dtd 3 Apr 79)

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that ▢ handcarried to your office

on 3 Apr. This paper should have been attached

as the Enclosure. Sorry for any inconvenience.

secretary)

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COMPUTER SUBCOMMITTEE   22 JAN 1979

TO: Computer Security Subcommittee Members

FROM: Subcommittee Chairman, Computer Security

SUBJECT: Charter Amendment

1. I propose that we add to the Charter (DCID 1/11, Attachment 2) the responsibility of providing Computer Security in the Telecommunications field.

2. I propose to change the first paragraph of the Charter to read as follows:

"Review, formulate and recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence policies, standards and procedures to protect intelligence data stored, processed, or communicated by computer."

3. I ask you to express your views on this matter at the 24 January 1979 meeting. I also request you coordinate this proposed Charter Amendment within your agency and provide to me a written agency position no later than 22 February 1979.

STAT

Incl: a/s